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Abstract
A constraint-based data ﬂow analysis is formalised in the speciﬁcation language of the Coq proof
assistant. This involves deﬁning a dependent type of lattices together with a library of lattice functors
for modular construction of complex abstract domains. Constraints are represented in a way that
allows for both efﬁcient constraint resolution and correctness proof of the analysis with respect to an
operational semantics. The proof of existence of a solution to the constraints is constructive which
means that the extraction mechanism of Coq provides a provably correct data ﬂow analyser inOcaml
from the proof. The library of lattices and the representation of constraints are deﬁned in an analysis-
independent fashion that provides a basis for a generic framework for proving and extracting static
analysers in Coq.
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1. Introduction
Static program analysis is a fully automatic technique for proving properties about the
run-time behaviour of a program without actually executing it. The correctness of static
analyses can be proved formally by following the theory of abstract interpretation [9] that
provides a theory for relating two semantic interpretations of the same language. These
strong semantic foundations constitute one of the arguments advanced in favor of static pro-
gram analysis. The implementation of static analyses is usually based on well-understood
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constraint-solving techniques and iterative ﬁxpoint algorithms. In spite of the nice math-
ematical theory of program analysis and the solid algorithmic techniques available one
problematic issue persists, viz., the gap between the analysis that is proved correct on paper
and the analyser that actually runs on the machine. While this gap might be small for toy
languages, it becomes important when it comes to real-life languages for which the imple-
mentation and maintenance of program analysis tools become a software engineering task.
To eliminate this gap, we here propose a technique based on theorem proving in construc-
tive logic and the program-as-proofs paradigm. This allows to specify static analyses in a
way that ensures their well-formedness and facilitates their correctness proof. Moreover,
the constructive nature of the logic means that it is possible to extract, from the proof of
existence of a correct program analysis result, a static analyser that maps any given program
to their static analysis.
The development of the static analyser is done within the Coq proof assistant. Proofs in
Coq are constructive and correspond, via the Curry-Howard isomorphism, to programs in
a functional language with a rich type system. The program extraction mechanism in Coq
provides a tool for automatic translation of these proofs into a functional language with a
simpler type system, namelyOcaml. The extraction mechanism removes those parts of the
proof that are only concerned with proving that the result satisﬁes its speciﬁcation without
actually contributing to its construction. In the case of our static analyser, the constructive
part is concerned with calculating a solution to a system of constraints generated from the
program. The other part of the proof establishes that a solution to the constraints is indeed
a correct approximation of the program’s behaviour but does not contribute to the actual
construction of the solution.
The methodology that we present here is generic but we have chosen to develop it in
the concrete setting of a ﬂow analysis for Java Card byte code, presented in Section 2. The
motivation for choosing this particular analysis is that it deals with a minimalistic, yet repre-
sentative language with imperative, object-oriented and higher-order features, guaranteeing
that the approach is transferable to a variety of other analyses. The methodology comprises
two phases:
• the modular deﬁnition of a library of abstract domains of properties used in the analysis
(Section 3). The abstract domains are lattices satisfying a ﬁnite-ascending-chains con-
dition which makes it possible to extract a provably correct, generic constraint solver
based on ﬁxpoint iteration;
• a representation of a constraint-based analysis that allows to extract an analyser from the
proof of the existence of a best solution to the constraints, using the program extraction
mechanism available inCoq (Section 4) and at the same time allows to prove correctness
of the analysis (Section 5).
Section 6 compares with other work on formalizing the correctness of data ﬂow analyses,
and Section 7 concludes. Appendices A–E contain the formalization of the analyser and
is included as a service to those readers that want to see the details. However, the paper
is written so as to be understandable without having to read these appendices. The Coq
sources of the development are available online [20].
Notation: Functions whose type depends on the program being analysed will have de-
pendent type F : (P : Program) → T (P ) with type T depending on P . We will write FP
for the application of F to a particular program P . The paper uses a mixture of logic and
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Coq notation. Java Card byte code and Coq functions are written using the teletype font
(e.g., push in Section 2 and join in Section 3). Lattices and abstract operations on these
as well as their corresponding Coq types are written using the Roman font (e.g., p̂ush in
Section 2 and the domain of abstract states Ŝtate illustrated in Fig. 2).
A preliminary version of this article was presented at the European Symposium on Pro-
gramming (ESOP) 2004 [5]. The present article is a thoroughly revised version that contains
a more detailed description of the lattice library, the lattice constructors and the proof of
well-foundedness of the lattices, a simpliﬁed representation of the constraints generated by
the analysis and a more detailed presentation of the correctness proofs.
2. A static analysis for carmel
The analysis which serves as a basis for our work is a data ﬂow analysis for the Carmel
intermediate representation of Java Card byte code [15] speciﬁed using the Flow Logic for-
malism [12] and proved correct on paper with respect to an operational semantics [22]. The
language is a byte code for a stack-oriented machine, much like the Java Card byte code.
Instructions include stack operations, numeric operations, conditionals, object creation and
modiﬁcation, and method invocation and return. It is given a small-step operational seman-
tics with a state of the form 〈〈h, 〈m,pc, l, s〉 :: sf 〉〉, where h is the heap of objects, and
〈m,pc, l, s〉 :: sf is a call stack consisting of frames of the form 〈m,pc, l, s〉 where each
frame contains a method name m and a program point pc within m, a set of local variables
l, and a local operand stack s (see [22] for details). Here and everywhere in the paper, “::”
denotes the “cons” operation on lists.
The transition relation →I describes how an instruction I affects the state. We give as
example the rules deﬁning the instructions push for pushing a value onto the operand
stack, invokevirtual for calling a virtual method, and return for returning from a
virtual method call. The expression instructionAtP (m, pc) denotes the instruction found at
address (m, pc) in the program P .
The rule (1) reads as follows: the instruction push c at address (m, pc) of state  =
〈〈h, 〈m,pc, l, s〉 :: sf 〉〉 has the effect of pushing c on the operand stack s of  and advancing
to the instruction at pc + 1.
instructionAtP (m, pc) = push c
〈〈h, 〈m,pc, l, s〉 :: sf 〉〉 →push c 〈〈h, 〈m,pc + 1, l, c :: s〉 :: sf 〉〉 , (1)
instructionAtP (m, pc) = invokevirtualM
h(loc) = o m′ = lookUp(M, class(o))
f ′ = 〈m′, 1, V , ε〉 f ′′ = 〈m,pc, l, s〉
〈〈h, 〈m,pc, l, loc :: V :: s〉 :: sf 〉〉 →invokevirtual M 〈〈h, f ′ :: f ′′ :: sf 〉〉 , (2)
instructionAtP (m, pc) = return f ′ =
〈
m′, pc′, l′, s′
〉
〈〈h, 〈m,pc, l, v :: s〉 :: f ′ :: sf 〉〉 →return 〈〈h, 〈m′, pc′ + 1, l′, v :: s′〉 :: sf 〉〉 . (3)
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The rule (2) is slightly more complicated. It reads: for M a method name, the instruction
invokevirtual M at address (m, pc) of state  = 〈〈h, f :: sf 〉〉 requires that the ﬁrst
frame f on the call stack of  has an operand stack of the form loc :: V :: s, i.e., it starts
with a heap location denoted by loc, followed by a vector of argument values V . The actual
method that will be called is determined by the lookUp function that searches upwards in the
class hierarchy for the methond nameM , starting from the class of the object o that resides
in the heap h at the location loc. The new method, together with its starting point pc = 1,
its vector V of actual parameters, and an empty operand stack ε, constitute a new frame f ′
pushed on top of the call stack of the resulting state ′ = 〈〈h, f ′ :: f ′′ :: sf 〉〉. Note, however,
that the second frame f ′′ in the call stack is also modiﬁed: the sequence loc :: V has been
removed from the operand stack of f . This semantics of the invokevirtual instruction
(which corresponds to the operational deﬁnition of the semantics of Java Card), together
with the corresponding rules describing its static analysis, made for the most challenging
part of the correctness proofs (we return to this point in Section 5).
Finally, the return rule (3) removes the last frame from the call stack, and transfers the
return value v (from the top of the last frame’s operand stack) to the operand stack of the
calling frame f ′.
2.1. Carmel ﬂow logic
The Carmel Flow Logic deﬁned by Hansen [12] speciﬁes a constraint-based data ﬂow
analysis for Carmel. This analysis computes a safe approximation of the states that can
occur at any program point during execution of a program. This information can then be
used to optimize virtual method calls or verify speciﬁc properties on the control ﬂow graph
(see e.g. [4]). Programs may contain virtual method calls, which are dynamically resolved
at execution time; the analysis reﬂects this behaviour, and attempts to compute a precise
approximation of the called methods and their return values.
Concrete semantic values are either integers or object references. Object references are
abstracted by the classes of the objects they refer to, thus, an abstract value is either a subset
of the set of classes of the program P or a numerical abstraction. This means that the type
V̂alP of abstract values depends on the program P being analysed. This is an example of
a dependency that it is important to make explicit because it ensures the ﬁniteness of the
abstract domain which would otherwise have an inﬁnite number of subsets of classes. The
abstract domain of local variables is another example of an abstract domain that depends
on the actual program being analysed (namely, on the number of local variables of the
program).
For each program point in P , of the form (methodNameP × progCountP ), the local
variables (resp. the operand stack) are abstracted by an array of type ̂LocalVarP (resp. a
stack of type ŜtackP ) of abstract values. Then, the abstract state domain:
ŜtateP = ĤeapP ×
(
methodNameP × progCountP → ̂LocalVarP
)
×
(
methodNameP × progCountP → ŜtackP
)
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contains an over-approximation of all possible concrete heaps 1 and, for each programpoint,
an over-approximation of the local variables and of the operand stack. These approxima-
tions are formalized by a relation ∼ that connects the concrete domains of the operational
semantics and the abstract domains. In logical terms, s ∼ a if a is a property of s. In
set-theoretic terms, s ∼ a if s is a member of the set of states described by a. The formal
deﬁnition of the ∼ relation can be found in the Appendix. Here, we only give an intuitive
description:
• a reference to object o is approximated by an abstract value Vˆ (written ref (o) ∼ Vˆ )
whenever Vˆ is a set of classes that contains the class of o,
• the vector of local variables l and operand stack s at a given program address (m, pc),
are approximated pointwise,
• a concrete state 〈〈h, 〈m,pc, l, s〉 :: sf 〉〉 is approximated by an abstract state ̂ = (Hˆ , (Lˆ,
Sˆ)) whenever h ∼ Hˆ , l ∼ Lˆ(m, pc), and s ∼ Sˆ(m, pc).
The abstract domains are further described in Section 3. An important property of the
approximation relation ∼ is the monotonicity with respect to the abstract order . It says
that, for each concrete value a (be it a heap, a stack, or a vector of local variables) and
abstract values Â, Â′ in the corresponding abstract domain, if a ∼ Â and Â  Â′ then
a ∼ Â′ holds as well. This property of∼ is proved inCoq once and for all for each concrete
and corresponding abstract domain. The relation ∼ is used extensively in Section 5 where
we show how to prove correctness of the analysis in Coq.
The speciﬁcation of the ﬂow logic consists of a set of inference rules that for each Carmel
instruction deﬁne a constraint over an abstract state ̂ ∈ Ŝtate. For ̂ =
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
to be
a correct abstraction of program P , ̂ must satisfy the constraints of the instructions of P .
For example, if a push instruction is present at address (m, pc), the following constraints
should be satisﬁed:
p̂ush
(
c, Sˆ (m, pc)
)
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1) , (4)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1) , (5)
where p̂ush is the abstract push operation from the abstract domain of stacks.
The constraints (6) and (7) below are attached to the invokevirtual instruction. Other
constraints attached to this instruction can be found in the Appendix. Together, the con-
straints (6) and (7) describe the relation between the value of the abstract stack Sˆ at an
address (m, pc) where a method named M is called by an invokevirtual instruction,
and the value of Sˆ at the address (m, pc + 1) that follows the method’s return.
p̂opn
(
Sˆ(m, pc), 1+ nbArgs(M)
)
 p̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc + 1)
)
(6)
∀cl ∈ t̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc)
)
, ∀m′ ∈ lookUp(M, cl). (7a)
t̂op
(
Sˆ(m′, Ret (m′))
)
 t̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc + 1)
)
(7b)
1 The precise descriptions of the concrete and abstract heap domains are not essential for understanding the rest
of the paper; they can be found in the Appendix.
D. Cachera et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 342 (2005) 56–78 61
In particular, the constraint (7), explained below, plays a particular role in the correctness
proof described in Section 5. Assume that the program performs an invokevirtual M
instruction at an address (m, pc). The constraint (7) computes both (7a) a set ofmethods that
contains the method actually called by invokevirtual, and (7b) an over-approximation
of the return values of all the methods computed at Step (7a).
• Step (7a) simulates the semantics of invokevirtual (rule (2)). The rule says that the
method actually called is found by looking up for methods named M , in the class of
the object referenced by the top of the concrete operand stack when the execution is at
address (m, pc). The constraint (7a,7b) simulates this behaviour at the abstract level: it
searches the class hierarchy for methods calledM starting from all the classes contained
in the corresponding abstract value t̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc)
)
.
• Step (7b) is performed by simulating the semantics of the return instruction. By the
semantics rule (3), the return value of the method m′ actually called is placed on the
top of the operand stack at address (m, pc + 1). Hence, the constraint (7) imposes that
t̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc + 1)
)
is greater than the abstract return values t̂op
(
Sˆ(m′, Ret (m′))
)
of
all methods m′ computed at Step (7a), where Ret(m′) is a virtual program point used
for collecting abstract results of each method m′.
Note that Step (7a) implicitly assumes that the abstract value t̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc)
)
correctly
approximates the top of the concrete operand stack when execution is at address (m, pc),
i.e., before the invokevirtual instruction. That is, the abstract value t̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc)
)
is
a set of classes which contains the class of the object o that is referenced by the top of the
concrete operand stack when execution is at address (m, pc). This assumption becomes a
proof obligation, to be discharged when proving the correctness of the analysis (cf. Section
5).
3. Constructing abstract domains
In this section we deﬁne a data type for lattices (lattice A), parameterized by the
type of elements of the lattice. We also deﬁne higher-order functions which build a lattice
object from other lattice objects. This allows to construct the abstract domains (of local
variables, stacks, etc.) in a compositional fashion from a collection of base abstract domains.
The advantage of this modular technique of combining and building lattices is that we do
not have to prove properties (such as the ﬁnite ascending chain condition, see below) for
one big, ﬁnal lattice, but can do so in a modular fashion for every type of lattice used.
Furthermore, local changes to the lattice structure do not invalidate the overall proof.
A lattice object is a record structure with two families of ﬁelds: the functional ﬁelds
which are the operations that will remain in the extracted Ocaml code, and the logical
ﬁelds that contain properties about the lattice. E.g., the ﬁeld join is a functional ﬁeld that
contains the least upper bound operator of the lattice, whereas the ﬁeld acc_property is
a logical ﬁeld stating that the lattice satisﬁes the ascending chain condition. The lattice type
is conveniently deﬁned as a record type inCoq, as shown in the followingCoq declaration,
where only details for the order relation, the join operation and the well-foundedness of
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the lattice are given. The well-foundedness ﬁeld will be explained in detail in Section 3.1.
Record Lattice [A: Set]: Type := {
eq : A → A → Prop;
eq_prop : … ;; eq is an equivalence relation
order : A → A → Prop;
order_refl : ∀x, y :A (eq x y) ⇒ (order x y);
order_antisym : ∀x, y :A (order x y) ⇒ (order y x) ⇒ (eq x y);
order_trans : ∀x, y, z :A (order x y) ⇒ (order y z)
⇒ (order x z);
join : A → A → A;
join_bound1 : ∀x, y :A (order x (join x y));
join_bound2 : ∀x, y :A (order y (join x y));
join_least : ∀x, y, z :A (order x z) ⇒ (order y z)
⇒ (order (join x y) z);
eq_dec : A → A → bool
eq_dec_prop : … ;; eq_dec is a correct test of equality
bottom : A;
bottom_prop : … ;; bottom is the least element
top : A;
top_prop : … ;; top is the greatest element
acc_property : (well_founded A (x, y :A, ¬(eq y x)∧(order y x)))
}
In this large object, the properties in the logical ﬁelds are only necessary during the Coq
development to ensure the logical coherence of the structure. Hence only the four functional
ﬁelds appear in the extracted Ocaml lattice type:
type ’a lattice = { join : (’a → ’a → ’a);
eq_dec : (’a → ’a → bool);
bottom : ’a;
top : ’a }
Declaring a structure of Lattice type will result in a series of proof obligations, one for
each of the logical ﬁelds. Of these, the last property acc_property is the most difﬁcult
to establish. It expresses that the strict dual order is well-founded, or, in other words, that
there are no inﬁnite, ascending chains. It is the key property used to prove the termination
of the ﬁnal analyser. Thus, strictly speaking we are dealing with lattices satisfying the ﬁnite
ascending chain-condition but we will for convenience use the general term lattice in the
rest of this document.
3.1. Lattice constructors and proof of well-foundedness
The lattices are built from two base lattices using four lattice constructors. These con-
structors are not tied to this particular analysis and can be reused in other contexts.
prodLattice : (Lattice A) → (Lattice B) → (Lattice A ∗ B)
sumLattice : (Lattice A) → (Lattice B) → (Lattice (lift A+B))
stackLattice : (Lattice A) → (Lattice (stack A))
arrayLattice : (max:nat) → (Lattice A) → (Lattice (array max A)).
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Fig. 1. Hasse diagrams of lattices.
The most difﬁcult part of each lattice construction is the proof of preservation of
acc_property (the ascending chain condition), which is essential for deﬁning an anal-
yser that terminates. This is essentially a termination proofwhich is typically hard to conduct
in a proof assistant because the standard techniques of structural orders or well-chosenmea-
sures do not apply in the case of lattice orders. The proof has to operate directly with the
deﬁnition of awell-foundedorder.Weuse the standard inductive deﬁnition of awell-founded
relation, as used in the built-in Coq predicate well_founded:
Deﬁnition 1. Let A be a type and ≺ a binary relation on A.
• The accessibility predicate is inductively deﬁned by: an element x of typeA is accessible
if and only if all the predecessors of x are accessible,
• a binary predicate ≺ on a type A is well-founded if all the elements of A are accessible
for ≺.
The prodLattice function is the standard cartesian product with the pointwise order
(x1, y1) A×B (x2, y2) iff x1 A x2 ∧ y1 B y2
The ascending chain condition of this structure is proved using the fact that the strict reverse
order is a sub-relation of the lexicographic product
(x1, y1)A×B(x2, y2) ⇒ x1Ax2 ∨ (x1 =A x2 ∧ y1By2)
The sumLattice function builds the separate sum of two lattices A and B according to
the Hasse diagram of Fig. 1. The acc_property proof of this lattice is done following
the different layers of the diagram: ﬁrst, we prove that the top element is accessible (no
predecessor); then, that all the elements of A, B are accessible (using the fact that  is
accessible and A well-founded). Finally, we prove that ⊥ is accessible because all its
predecessors are accessible (they are elements of A ∪ B ∪ {}).
The stackLattice constructor builds the lattice of stacks of elements of type A. In this
lattice, stacks with different sizes are incomparable, according to the Hasse diagram of Fig.
1. The ascending chain condition proof again follows the layers of the Hasse diagram but
is more technical because of the inﬁnite width of the lattice: for the middle layer, that is,
the level of stacks, we use an induction on the stack size. The case of the empty stack is
trivial (no predecessor) and for the induction step, we observe that strict inverse order for
stacks of size n+ 1 is a sub-relation of the lexicographic product between (A,) (which is
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supposed well-founded) and the set of stacks of size n (which is well-founded for the strict
inverse order by induction hypothesis).
(x1 :: l1)n+1(x2 :: l2) ⇒ x1Ax2 ∨ (x1 =A x2 ∧ l1nl2) .
The fourth constructor arrayLattice builds the type of arrays whose elements live in a
lattice and whose size is bounded by a parameter max, using a pointwise order. Notice that
arrays of different sizes may be comparable whereas this is not the case for the order we
have deﬁned on stacks.
t1  t2 iff ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , max}, t1[i] A t2[i].
The array lattice frequently occurs in ﬂow-sensitive analyses where the number of abstract
variables depends on the program to analyse—these are then conveniently collected in an
array. An efﬁcient implementation of arrays is therefore crucial for obtaining an efﬁcient
extracted code, and we have optimized it by using an efﬁcient tree representation of integer
maps in the spirit of [19]. The crucial ideas of this implementation are
• to represent arrays using binary trees whose nodes are elements of the array,
• to represent indexes using a binary notation; an element at position i in an array is found
by interpreting the binary notation of i as the “path” to follow from the root, and
• to have a lazy structure: if a searched node is missing, its value is by convention ⊥A,
which allows to represent an array whose elements are all ⊥A by an empty leaf.
The acc_property proof of this lattice is performed by deﬁning an order on trees (a leaf
is smaller that any tree; two nodes are smaller if their heads are in theA relation and if their
descendents are smaller as well), proving its well-foundedness, and, ﬁnally, connecting this
order to the array order. It is certainly the most technical of this library. More details on this
proof can be found in the corresponding Coq development.
In addition to these four functors, two base lattices are deﬁned:
• the ﬂat lattice of integer constants (as used e.g., in constant propagation analysis),
• the lattice of ﬁnite sets over a subset {0, . . . , max} of integers: again, an efﬁcient im-
plementation is proposed, by encoding sets using boolean arrays, hence based on the
arrayLattice functor and two-valued lattice of Fig. 1.
The lattice employed in our particular analysis is given a graphical representation in
Fig. 2 (see Appendix for a mathematical description of the lattice). In this diagram, each
node represents a lattice functor whose parameters are the sons of the node. For the array
functor and the ﬁnite-set lattice we write the index domain inside brackets. The modular
construction saves a considerable amount of time and effort, e.g., compared to proving
acc_property for the lattice in Fig. 2 as a whole.
3.2. Iterative constraint solving over lattices
Implementing a static program analyser involves building a constraint solver that can
compute a solution to constraints like the ﬂow logic constraints shown in Section 2 [17].
The problem of solving a set of constraints over a lattice L of abstract values can be
transformed into calculating a ﬁxpoint of a monotone function over L—a ﬁxpoint that
for reasons of precision should be as small as possible. More precisely, let f : L → L
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Fig. 2. The lattice of abstract states (each xXP represents the number of distinct xX elements in program P ).
be a monotone function over L. The basic ﬁxpoint operator lfp takes such a monotone
function f and computes the least element x of L verifying f (x) = x. Furthermore, by a
corollary of the Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem, this element can be iteratively calculated as
the limit of the (stabilizing) sequence (f n(⊥))n∈N. Formally, we deﬁne the operator lfp
of type
(A:Set) → (L:(Lattice A)) → (f:(A→A)) → (monotone L f) →
∃x:A, (eq L x (f x)) ∧ (∀y:A (eq L y (f y)) ⇒ (order L x y)).
That is, lfp takes four arguments: a data type A, a lattice L on A, a function f on A
and a proof that f is monotone. It returns the least ﬁxed point of f . We prove in Coq that
this type is non-empty, which here consists in instantiating the existentially quantiﬁed x in
the type deﬁnition by limn→∞ f n (⊥). The extraction mechanism of programs from proofs
generates for lfp the following Ocaml code, in which the purely logical part of the proof
(i.e., the part concerned with proving that the chosen witness veriﬁes the ﬁxpoint equation)
has been removed:
let lfp L f =
let rec aux x =
if (L.eq_dec x (f x)) then x else aux (f x)
in aux L.bottom
Weuse x = f (x) as halting condition here, but, as is well known from the ﬁxed point theory,
we could equally well have used the post-ﬁxed point condition f (x)  x. The equality test
appears to be more efﬁcient for the majority of lattices used in our case study.
In order to use the lfp operator to solve the constraints arising from the Java Card ﬂow
analysis it must be extended to a function lfp_list that can deal with systems of the form
{fi(x)  x}i=1,...,n
Given a list f1, . . . , fn of monotone functions of type L → L, the operator lfp_list
computes the least solution x of the system by a round-robin iteration strategy in which the
constraints are iterated in increasing order. This computation is implemented by applying
the lfp operator on the monotone function f˜n ◦ · · · ◦ f˜1, where f˜i (x) = x unionsqfi(x) for every
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index i. The fact that this computes a solution to the constraint system is formalised in the
type of lfp_list, which is expressed in Coq as follows:
(l: (L → L) list) → ( ∀ f ∈ l, (monotone L f)) →
∃ x:A, ( ∀ f ∈ l, (order L (f x) x)) ∧
( ∀ y:A ( ∀ f ∈ l, (order L (f y) y)) → (order L x y))
(8)
This type means that any application of lfp_list to a list of functions fi must be ac-
companied by a proof of the monotonicity of each fi . Read at a proof-theoretic level, it
states that from the proofs of monotonicity of the fi we can prove the existence of a least
common post-ﬁxpoint for all of the fi . This function will be used as a generic constraint
solver in Section 4.
4. Constructive constraints
We now turn to the problem of building an analyser that implements the ﬂow analysis
from Section 2. The development will be structured into three phases:
(1) The generation of a set of constraints for each instruction.
(2) The building of an analyser analyse that computes an abstract state verifying all the
constraints generated for a given program.
(3) The proof of correctness of these constraints wrt. the Carmel semantics.
In the rest of this section, we focus on the constraint generation and resolution (Phases 1
and 2). In Section 5 we describe the proof of correctness (Phase 3).
Let P̂ be the predicate meaning that the abstract state ̂ veriﬁes all constraints of pro-
gramP (this predicate is deﬁned formally in Deﬁnition 5 below). Phases 2 and 3 correspond
to proving the following two theorems:
Theorem 2. For each program P , there exists an abstract state ̂ satisfying all constraints
of P :
∀P : Program, ∃̂ : ŜtateP . P̂.
The constructive proof of this theorem provides the analyser itself: the abstract state ̂ we
construct corresponds to analyse(P ).
Theorem 3. An abstract state verifying all the constraints of a program P is a correct
approximation of the operational semantics of P :
∀P : Program, ̂ : ŜtateP . P̂⇒ [[P ]] ∼ ̂,
where [[P ]] denotes the set of reachable states of programP and∼ is the correctness relation
between concrete domains of the operational semantics and the abstract domains.
Putting these two theorems together, we get the correctness of the analyser:
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Theorem 4. (Global Correctness)
[[P ]] ∼ analyse(P ).
4.1. Generating the constraints
When formalising the analysis, several representations of the constraints are possible.
• For the correctness proof (Phase 3), it is sufﬁcient to knowwhich order relation is induced
by the constraints on a given set of components of the abstract state. Using an inductive
deﬁnition for constraints would naturally provide the necessary predicates for this phase.
Relational constraints written as (4)–(7) could be translated in Coq in a straightforward
manner using inductive deﬁnitions.
• On the other hand, the construction of an effective analyser (Phase 2) requires to represent
constraints in a functional form like f (X)  X. This representation is typically difﬁcult
to extract directly from inductive deﬁnitions. 2
This is why an internal representation of constraints is deﬁned in Phase 1, which allows for
both interpretations and leaves room for reuse in other analyses.
Looking at Formulas (4) and (5) for the push instruction (Section 2.1), we note that the
representation of constraints must contain the following informations: (i) the components
of the abstract state that are involved in the constraint, (ii) a start address ad1 and an end
address ad2 of the data ﬂow, and (iii) the transformation F that is applied to the data that
ﬂows. For example, constraint (4) only affects the abstract state Sˆ, and we have ad1 =
pc, ad2 = pc+ 1, and F = Sˆ.p̂ush(c, Sˆ). This naturally leads to an inductive data type of
the form
type ConstraintP =
|S2S of Address∗Address∗(ŜtackP → ŜtackP )
|L2L of Address∗Address∗( ̂LocalVarP → ̂LocalVarP )
...
(9)
where each constructor represents a type of dependency between components of the ab-
stract state. For example, S2S is a constructor to express a constraint on an abstract stack
which depends on another abstract stack. For the particular analysis discussed here eleven
constructors were employed.
Each constraint, initially acting on a part of the abstract state, is extended to a function
on the whole abstract state, using a mapping
F[[·]] : ConstraintP →
(
ŜtateP → ŜtateP
)
for which we prove that it preserves the monotonicity of constraints. E.g., for the push
instruction
F[[(S2S ad1 ad2 F)]] := (H,L, S). (H,L, S[ad2 $→ F(S(ad1))]),
F[[(L2L ad1 ad2 F)]] := (H,L, S). (H,L[ad2 $→ F(L(ad1))], S).
2 Cognoscenti will know that the Coq extraction mechanism is not able to extract computational content of
inductive deﬁnition made in the sort Prop.
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Based on this deﬁnition of the constraints we deﬁne a function cst_gen, which for
each address, returns the list of constraints for the corresponding instruction in a syntax
of the form (9). Continuing with the push instruction, the corresponding code part is
cst_genP := (m,pc)
Case instructionAtP (m,pc) of
| (push c) → (S2S (m,pc) (m,pc+1) Sˆ. p̂ush
(
cˆ, Sˆ
)
) ::
(L2L (m,pc) (m,pc+1) Lˆ. Lˆ)
…
The well-formedness of this function depends on the actual program P being analysed
because every instance of (m, pc)must be shown to refer to a valid program point of P . In
a paper-and-pencil proof, this is often left as an implicit hypothesis. In a formal proof how-
ever, this fact must be stated explicitly. In a dependently typed framework, the constraint
generation will thus be parameterised by the program being analysed, yielding a function
cst_genP which takes as argument an address (m, pc) in the program P and generates
the constraints corresponding to the type of instruction at (m, pc).
We now can formally deﬁne what it means for an abstract state ̂ to verify all the con-
straints of a program P .
Deﬁnition 5. Let AddrP denote the set of addresses appearing in P :
P̂ ≡ ∀(m, pc) : AddrP ,∀c ∈ cst_genP (m, pc). F[[c]](ˆ)  ˆ
4.2. Construction of the analyser
Recall that the goal is to build an analyser that, given an input program, computes an ab-
stract state that veriﬁes all the constraints of the program.We construct a functionanalyse
of dependent type (P : Program)→ ŜtateP which must verify
∀P : Program, Panalyse(P ) (10)
In addition,wewant to obtain a non-trivial solution of the constraint system: e.g., an analyser
returning the top element of the lattice for any input is a correct solution, but of poor interest.
We thus add the requirement that our solution is the least solution of the constraint system:
∀P : Program, ̂ : ŜtateP P̂⇒ analyse(P )  ̂. (11)
The constraint resolution tool is based on the generic solver lfp_list (8) described in
Section 3.2. The most difﬁcult part of the work has already be done during the deﬁnition of
the solver, i.e., proof of termination and correctness. It is instantiated here with the particular
abstract state lattice of the analysis (depicted in Fig. 2); then,
• For each instruction of program P , the constraints are collected from the lists deﬁned
by cst_genP (cf. Section 4.1).
• Each constraint is translated into a function on abstract states using the mapping F . The
resulting list of functional constraints is called collect_funcP . As F preserves the
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monotonicity of constraints, we conclude that
∀f ∈ collect_funcP f is monotone. (12)
We now have all the ingredients to deﬁne the constraint solver:
analyse(P ) = lfp_list(ŜtateP , collect_funcP , collect_func_monotone)
where collect_func_monotone is the name given to the proof of (12).
By the properties of lfp_list (deﬁned by Formula (8)) we know that analyse(P )
is the least abstract state ̂ in ŜtateP verifying
∀f ∈ collect_funcP f (̂)  ̂. (13)
Thus, analyse(P ) is the least ̂ satisfying P̂.
We stress that this approach deﬁnes a methodology that remains valid for other analyses.
Indeed, all proofs in this section are independent of the system of constraints deﬁned by
the user. They only depend on the different types of constraints introduced as in (9) (S2S,
L2L,...). As a consequence, modiﬁcations to the system of constraints only affect proofs
made about themonotonicity of constraints andduringSection 5, rather than the construction
and the correctness of the solver itself.
5. Correctness
Section 4 has shown that an effective solver for the constraints of a program exists. We
now show that the solver is indeed a correct analyser for the program. The analysis is correct
if every abstract state ̂ satisfying all the constraints of the analysis is an approximation of
the reachable states [[P ]] of the program:
∀P : Program, ̂ : ŜtateP . P̂⇒ [[P ]] ∼ ̂. (14)
The implication (14) has been proved in Coq by well-founded induction on the length of
the program executions. The base step is trivial. The induction step depends on whether the
last instruction is return or some other instruction.
5.1. Induction Step: the non-return Instructions
For I an instruction, let →I denote the transition relation of I (examples of which
have been given in Section 2). The general form of the induction step for any Carmel
instruction I &= return is of the following form.
P̂ ⇒ ∀,′ ∈ [[P ]], ∼ ̂ ∧ →I ′ ⇒ ′ ∼ ̂. (15)
That is, if a state  is approximated by an abstract state ̂ that satisﬁes the constraints
of program P , and if, by performing instruction I , the state  becomes ′, then ′ is
approximated by ̂ as well. We now sketch the proof of (15).
(1) A Coq script unfolds the deﬁnition of the transition rule for instruction I .
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(2) Then, another script unfolds the deﬁnitions of  ∼ ̂ and P and automatically turns
them intohypotheses of the currentCoqgoal. 3 For example, if=〈〈h, 〈m,pc, l, s〉::sf〉〉,
̂ = (Ĥ , L̂, Ŝ), and I = push c then the following hypotheses are generated:
s ∼ Ŝ(m, pc), p̂ush (c, Ŝ (m, pc))  Ŝ (m, pc + 1) . (16)
(3) Next, the conclusion of the Coq goal: ′ ∼ ̂— i.e., the new state ′ is approximated
by the abstract state ̂ = (Ĥ , L̂, Ŝ)— is split into three subgoals, one for each of the
components (Ĥ , L̂, Ŝ) of ̂.
For I = push c, the subgoal corresponding to the abstract stack Ŝ is
c :: s ∼ Ŝ(m, pc+ 1). (17)
(4) Finally, the subgoals generated at Step 3 are proved using the hypotheses generated at
Step 2 andmonotonicity of∼with respect to (cf. Section 2). For I = push c, the only
non-trivial subgoal is represented by Formula (17). It is proved using the fact that p̂ush is
a correct abstraction of the concrete push operator “::”, i.e., c :: s ∼ p̂ush (c, Ŝ (m, pc)).
This, togetherwith the hypothesis (16) and themonotonicity of the∼ relation for stacks,
implies the subgoal (17), and the proof is done.
5.2. Induction Step: the Case of the return Instruction
Formula (15) above has the general aspect of the induction step in a proof by simple induc-
tion. That is, if the abstract state ̂ approximates the concrete state , then ̂ also correctly
approximates all immediate successors ′ of . However, this simple implication could not
be proved for thereturn instruction. This is because the effect of thereturn is simulated
by a constraint (cf. Formula (7)) attached to a different instruction: the invokevirtual
instruction that called the method now performing the return. As seen in Section 2.1,
in order to evaluate which methods may have been called, the constraint (7) must be used
together with the assumption that the top of the concrete stack at the address (m, pc) where
the invokevirtual instruction has been performed, is correctly approximated by the
top of the abstract stack t̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc)
)
.
Moregenerally,weneed to assume that the concrete state′′where theinvokevirtual
instruction has been performed, was correctly approximated by the abstract state ̂ as well.
But ′′ may have been encountered arbitrarily far in the past. Hence, our proof of the in-
duction step for the return instruction uses awell-founded induction hypothesis, which im-
poses that the whole proof of correctness be done by well-founded
induction.
Let [[P ]]<n denote the set of states of program P that are reachable using less than n
instructions. The induction step for I = return is:
∀n ∈ N.[∀′′ ∈ [[P ]]<n. ′′ ∼ ̂] ⇒ ∀ ∈ [[P ]]<n,∀′.[ →I ′ ⇒ ′ ∼ ̂]. (18)
3 This script simulates the standard Coq inversion tactic for inductive datatypes.
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Formula (18) reads: if the abstract state ̂ approximate all earlier states ′′ (well-founded
induction hypothesis); and  evolves, by performing a return instruction, into ′; then,
̂ approximates ′ as well.
The proof of Theorem (18) is substantially more involved than the proofs of Theo-
rems (15). It should be pointed out that this difﬁculty had been avoided by a previous
pencil-and-paper proof [12], where some details—the actual JavaCard semantics of the
invokevirtual instruction—have been overlooked.
6. Related work
Proving correctness of program analyses is one of the main applications of the theory of
abstract interpretation [9]. However, most of the existing proofs are pencil-and-paper proofs
of analyses (formal speciﬁcations) and not mechanised proofs of analysers (implementa-
tions of analyses). The only attempt of formalizing the theory of abstract interpretation
with a proof assistant is that of Monniaux [16] who has built a Coq theory of Galois con-
nections. Prost in his thesis [21] conduces a theoretical study of the relation between type
theory and program analysis, but this work did not lead to an implementation of a concrete
analysis.
Mechanical veriﬁcation of program processing tools has so far mainly focussed on the
correctness of optimising compilers. Genet et al. [11] use the generic proof assistant PVS
for proving the correctness of algorithms for transforming Java Card byte code into themore
compact CAP format. Similar work was done by Denney [10], using the program extraction
mechanism of Coq. These optimizations do not involve any sophisticated static analysis.
Lerner et al. [14] have developed Cobalt, a dedicated programming language for writing
C program optimisers and automatically proving their soundness. This language allow to
deﬁne statement transformation guarded by predicates on execution traces. To prove the
correctness of the optimization, these transformation patterns produce proof-obligations to
be discharged by an automatic theorem prover. The authors propose an execution engine to
compile Cobalt descriptions in an executable form. The framework allows to write several
optimizations whose correctness is automatically proved by the Simplify theorem prover.
The scope of this work seem currently restricted to intra-procedural analysis with simple
lattices of approximations. Finally, ongoing work in the French research action “Concert”
[8] currently explores the feasibility of developing a realistic certiﬁed compiler in Coq.
First results concern the certiﬁcation of three classical low-level optimizations based on
dataﬂow analysis and some ﬁrst experiments in program transformation.
Previous formalizations of static analyses for Java (Card) byte code have all dealt with
intra-procedural type veriﬁcation. In contrast, we have also shown how to handle inter-
procedural data ﬂow analysis in a natural manner; this is due to the fact that we use the
general setting of Flow Logic [18] and constraint-based analysis. Research on mechanical
veriﬁcation of the Java byte code veriﬁer includes that of Barthe et al. [2] who have shown
how to formalise the Java Card byte code veriﬁcation in the proof assistant Coq by iso-
lating the byte code veriﬁcation in an executable semantics of the language. In [1], they
propose to automate the derivation of a certiﬁed veriﬁer from a formalization of the JCVM.
Their approach does not rely on a general theory of static analysis, and is oriented towards
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type veriﬁcation. Bertot [3] used the Coq system to extract a certiﬁed bytecode analyser
specialized for object initialization, but no attention has been paid to the efﬁciency of the
analyser. In [7], Coglio et al. described their ongoing efforts to implement a bytecode veri-
ﬁer by reﬁnement from the speciﬁcation of a constraint-solving problem on lattices. Klein
and Nipkow [13] have proved the correctness of a Java byte code veriﬁer using the proof
assistant Isabelle/HOL. In particular their work includes a correctness proof of Kildall’s
iterative workset algorithm for solving data ﬂow equations. They also provide a modular
construction of lattices. The major difference with our approach is the use of abstract data
types that are not implementable as such.
An alternative to the Coq proof extraction mechanism is the B method that has had
considerable industrial success. Casset et al. [6] have extracted a proof-carrying code-based
on-card bytecode veriﬁer for Java Card from a high-level speciﬁcation by a succession of
reﬁnement steps using the B technique. The development required the proof of thousands
of proof obligations, of which several hundreds could not be dealt with automatically by
the B prover. The B tool could most probably be used for building an analyser like ours
but we doubt that using B would lead to a simpler proof effort. In addition, the program
extraction mechanism in B does not enjoy the same solid foundations as that ofCoq. Hence
our decision to base our development on Coq.
7. Conclusion
The results presented in this article demonstrates that it is feasible to construct a non-
trivial, provably correct data ﬂow analyser using the program extraction mechanism of
constructive logic implemented in Coq. This bridges the gap that often exists between
a paper-speciﬁcation of an analysis and the analyser that is actually implemented. Our
approach applies to analyses expressed in the constraint-based Flow Logic speciﬁcation
framework and is hence applicable to a large variety of program analyses for different
language paradigms. We have instantiated it to a data ﬂow analysis for Java Card. To the
best of our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst formal construction (with proof of correctness) of a
data ﬂow analysis other than the Java byte code veriﬁer.
Formalising a program analyser in a proof assistant imposes a strict discipline that catches
a certain number of bugs, including typing errors in the speciﬁcation. The present develop-
ment revealed several (innocuous) inaccuracies in the pencil-and-paper speciﬁcations and
proof of correctness. Moreover, it pinpointed the adjustment that had been made of the
actual semantics of Java Card in the correctness proof on paper—an adjustment that (as
argued in Section 5.2) made the proof far simpler than a proof done against a more accurate
semantics.
Our methodology makes use of the proof-as-programs paradigm. This paradigm is some-
times presented as developing programs as a by-product of building a constructive proof
interactively and incrementally for an “existential” theorem with a proof assistant. While
this presentation is conceptually simple and appealing, the development of any non-trivial
piece of software (including the present analyser) rather tends to be done by deﬁning (most
of) the function and then showing that it is indeed a witness to the theorem. This technique
has the further advantage that it is simpler to control the efﬁciency of the resulting program.
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In our case, the provably correct analyser was developed by splitting the correctness proof
into
• an existential proof of a solution to a constraint system from which a constraint solver
can be extracted and,
• a proof that the solutions to the constraint system are correct approximations of the se-
mantics of the analysed program; this proof does not contribute to the actual construction
of the solution.
The methodology includes several steps of varying complexity. The development of the
lattice library required a Coq expert to structure the proofs of the properties associated
with the lattice constructors. Once this library in place, it turned out to be a relatively
straightforward task to prove correctness of the constraint generation and to extend the
constraint generation to instructions others than those originally studied. It took a Coq
neophyte less than 2 months to complete the correctness proof, including the time and
effort needed to understand the general framework of the project. Only basic features of the
tool, those available in any other general-purpose theorem prover, have been employed in
the correctness proof.
The program extraction mechanism has a reputation for producing inefﬁcient programs.
This is not the case with our methodology: the extracted analyser is about 2000 lines
of Ocaml code and takes only a few seconds to analyse 1000 lines of bytecode. The
extracted version of analyse has now a type Program→ Ŝtate because Ocaml does not
have dependent types. As mentioned above, the methodology leaves some possibilities for
programming the resolution mechanism. This, and the inclusion of widening operators, is
one important step forward to be accomplished. Another is further automation of the proof
obligations arising during the development of the analyser in order tomake themethodology
the standard way of implementing static analysers.
Appendix A. Syntax
Instruction ::= nop
push c
pop
dup
dup2
swap
numop op

stack manipulation
load x
store x
}
local variables manipulation
if pc
goto pc
}
jump
new cl
putfield f
getfield f
 heap manipulation
invokevirtual mid
return
}
method call and return
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Appendix B. Semantics
Value = num n n ∈ N
ref r r ∈ Reference
null
Stack = Value∗
LocalVar = Var→ Value
Frame = progCount× nameMethod× LocalVar× Stack
CallStack = Frame∗
Object = nameClass× (FieldName→ Value)
Heap = Reference→ Object⊥
State = Heap× CallStack
instructionAtP (m,pc)=nop
〈h,〈m,pc,l,s〉::sf 〉→nop〈h,〈m,pc+1,l,s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=push c
〈h,〈m,pc,l,s〉::sf 〉→push c〈h,〈m,pc+1,l,c::s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=pop
〈h,〈m,pc,l,v::s〉::sf 〉→pop〈h,〈m,pc+1,l,s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=dup
〈h,〈m,pc,l,v::s〉::sf 〉→dup〈h,〈m,pc+1,l,v::v::s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=dup2
〈h,〈m,pc,l,v1::v2::s〉::sf 〉→dup2〈h,〈m,pc+1,l,v1::v2::v1::v2::s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=swap
〈h,〈m,pc,l,v1::v2::s〉::sf 〉→swap〈h,〈m,pc+1,l,v2::v1::s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=numop op
〈h,〈m,pc,l,n1::n2::s〉::sf 〉→numop op〈h,〈m,pc+1,l,[op](n1,n2)::s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=load x
〈h,〈m,pc,l,s〉::sf 〉→load x 〈h,〈m,pc+1,l,l[x]::s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=store x
〈h,〈m,pc,l,v::s〉::sf 〉→store x 〈h,〈m,pc+1,l[x $→v],s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=if pc′ n=0
〈h,〈m,pc,l,n::s〉::sf 〉→if pc′ 〈h,〈m,pc′,l,s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=if pc′ n&=0
〈h,〈m,pc,l,n::s〉::sf 〉→if pc′ 〈h,〈m,pc+1,l,s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=goto pc′
〈h,〈m,pc,l,s〉::sf 〉→goto pc′ 〈h,〈m,pc′,l,s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m, pc) = new cl
∃ c ∈ classes(P )with nameClass(c) = cl (h′, loc) = newObject(cl, h)
〈h,〈m,pc,l,s〉::sf 〉→new cl〈h′,〈m,pc+1,l,loc::s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=putfield f h(loc)=o o′=o[f $→v]
〈h,〈m,pc,l,v::loc::s〉::sf 〉→putfield f 〈h[loc $→o′],〈m,pc+1,l,s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m,pc)=getfield f h(loc)=o
〈h,〈m,pc,l,loc::s〉::sf 〉→getfield f 〈h,〈m,pc+1,l,ﬁeldValue(o,f )::s〉::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m, pc) = invokevirtualM
h(loc) = o m′ = lookUp(M, class(o))
f ′ = 〈m′, 1, V , ε〉 f ′′ = 〈m,pc, l, s〉
〈h,〈m,pc,l,loc::V ::s〉::sf 〉→invokevirtual M 〈h,f ′::f ′′::sf 〉
instructionAtP (m, pc) = return f ′ =
〈
m′, pc′, l′, s′
〉
〈h,〈m,pc,l,v::s〉::f ′::sf 〉→return〈h,〈m′,pc′+1,l′,v::s′〉::sf 〉
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Appendix C. Abstract lattices
N̂um := N⊥ R̂efP := P(ClassNameP )
V̂alP :=
(
R̂efP + N̂um
)
⊥ ŜtackP :=
(
V̂al∗P
)
⊥
̂LocalVarP := VarP → V̂alP ÔbjectP := FieldNameP → V̂alP
ĤeapP := ClassNameP → ÔbjectP
ŜtateP := ĤeapP ×
(
nameMethodP × progCountP → ̂LocalVarP
)
×
(
nameMethodP × progCountP → ŜtackP
)
with
VarP := {x ∈ Var | x appears in P }
FieldNameP := {f ∈ FieldName | f appears in P }
ClassNameP := {cl ∈ ClassName | cl appears in P } .
Appendix D. Correctness relations
n ∼Num Nˆ iff Nˆ = {n} ∨ Nˆ = 
r ∼hRef Rˆ iff
(
h(r) = o ⇒ {class(o)} Ref Rˆ
)
v ∼hVal Vˆ iff v = null ∨ Vˆ = Val ∨(
v ∈ Reference ∧ Vˆ ∈ R̂ef ∧ v ∼hRef Vˆ
)
∨(
v ∈ Num ∧ Vˆ ∈ N̂um ∧ v ∼Num Vˆ
)
v1 :: · · · :: vn ∼hStack Sˆ iff Sˆ = Stack ∨(
Sˆ = Vˆ1 :: · · · :: Vˆn∧
v1 ∼hVal Vˆ1 ∧ · · · ∧ vn ∼hVal Vˆn
)
l∼hLocalVar Lˆ iff ∀ x ∈ Var, l(x) ∼hVal Lˆ (x)
o ∼hObject Oˆ iff ∀ f ∈ FieldName, ﬁeldValue(o, f ) ∼hVal Oˆ (f )
h ∼Heap Hˆ iff ∀ r ∈ Reference,
h(r) = o ⇒ o ∼hObject Hˆ (class(o))
〈〈h, 〈m,pc, l, s〉 :: sf 〉〉 ∼State
(
Hˆ , Sˆ, Lˆ
)
iff h ∼Heap Sˆ ∧
l ∼hLocalVar Lˆ (m, pc) ∧
s ∼hStack Sˆ (m, pc)
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Appendix E. Constraints
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : nop
iff Sˆ (m, pc)  Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : push c
iff p̂ush
(̂
c, Sˆ (m, pc)
)
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : pop
iff p̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : numop op
iff b̂inop
(
op, Sˆ (m, pc)
)
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : dup
iff p̂ush
(
t̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
, Sˆ (m, pc)
)
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : dup2
iff p̂ush
(
t̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
, p̂ush
(
t̂op
(
p̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
))
, Sˆ (m, pc)
))
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : swap
iff p̂ush
(
t̂op
(
p̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
))
, p̂ush
(
t̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
, p̂op
(
p̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
))))
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : load x
iff p̂ush
(
âpply
(
Lˆ (m, pc) , x
)
, Sˆ (m, pc)
)
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : store x
iff p̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
ŝubst
(
Lˆ (m, pc) , x, t̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
))
 Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : if pc′
iff t̂est=0
(
t̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
, p̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
))
 Sˆ (m,pc′)
t̂est=0
(
t̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
, Lˆ (m, pc)
)
 Lˆ (m,pc′)
t̂est&=0
(
t̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
, p̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
))
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
t̂est&=0
(
t̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
, Lˆ (m, pc)
)
 Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : new cl
iff p̂ush
(
{cl} , Sˆ (m, pc)
)
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
d̂efault(cl)  âpply
(
Hˆ , cl
)
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(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : getfield f
iff ∀cl ∈ t̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
:
p̂ush
(
âpply
(
âpply
(
Hˆ , cl
)
, f
)
, p̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
))
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : putfield f
iff p̂op
(
p̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
))
 Sˆ (m, pc + 1)
Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
∀cl ∈ t̂op
(
p̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
))
:
t̂op
(
Sˆ (m, pc)
)
 âpply
(
âpply
(
Hˆ , cl
)
, f
)
(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : invokevirtualM
iff Lˆ (m, pc)  Lˆ (m, pc + 1)
p̂opn
(
Sˆ(m, pc), 1+ nbArgs(M)
)
 p̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc + 1)
)
∀cl ∈ t̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc)
)
,∀m′ ∈ lookUp(M, cl),
t̂op
(
Sˆ(m′,Ret(m′))
)
 t̂op
(
Sˆ(m, pc + 1)
)
{cl} :: p̂opn
(
Sˆ (m, pc) , nbArgs(M)
)
 Lˆ (m′, 1) [0..n]
n̂il  Sˆ (m′, 1)(
Hˆ , Lˆ, Sˆ
)
(m, pc) : return
iff Sˆ (m, pc)  Sˆ (m,Ret(m))
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